enigmail-2.1.5-bp152.1.9

- enigmail 2.1.5:
  * Security issue: unsigned MIME parts displayed as signed boo#1159973
  * Ensure that upgrading GnuPG 2.0.x to 2.2.x upgrade converts keyring format
  * Make Enigmail Compatible with Protected-Headers spec, draft 2

- enigmail 2.1.4:
  * Fixes for UI glitches
  * Option to "Attach public key to messages" was not restored properly

- enigmail 2.1.3:
  * fix a bug in the setup wizard that could lead the wizard to
    never complete scanning the inbox

- boo#1151317: SeaMonkey is no longer supported. Update description
  and no longer put in SeaMonkey addons path

- enigmail 2.1.2:
  * compatibility with Mozilla Thunderbird 68
  * New simplified setup wizard
  * Full support for keys.openpgp.org
  * Default to ECC keys on GnuPG 2.1 or later
  * Autocrypt: implemented key-gossip and updates to known keys

- enimail 2.0.12:
  * set the default keyserver to keys.openpgp.org in order to
    mitigate the SKS Keyserver Network Attack boo#1141025

- enigmail 2.0.11:
  * CVE-2019-12269: Specially crafted inline PGP messages could
    spoof a "correctly signed" message (boo#1135855)

- enigmail 2.0.10:
  * various bug fixes for configuring and handling encrypted e-mail
  * UI fixes for dialogs, messages, and dark Thunderbird themes

- enigmail 2.0.9, fixing one security issues:
  * An HTTP authentication dialog maye displayed during web key
    discovery, allowing remote attackers to possibly trick the user
    into entering e-mail credentials (bsc#1118935)
- other bugs fixed:
  * pEp - PGP/MIME signed-only messages are ignored
  * Autocrypt overrules manually created Per-Recipient Rules
  * "Re:" prefix on subject line disappears when editing encrypted,
    saved draft

- enigmail 2.0.8:
  This release addresses a security issue and
  solves a few regression bugs.
  * a security issue has been fixed that allows an attacker to prepare
    a plain, unauthenticated HTML message in a way that it looks like
    it's signed and/or encrypted (boo#1104036)

- enigmail 2.0.7:
  * CVE-2018-12020: Mitigation against GnuPG signature spoofing:
    Email signatures could be spoofed via an embedded "--filename"
    parameter in OpenPGP literal data packets. This update prevents
    this issue from being exploited if GnuPG was not updated
    (boo#1096745)
  * CVE-2018-12019: The signature verification routine interpreted
    User IDs as status/control messages and did not correctly keep
    track of the status of multiple signatures. This allowed remote
    attackers to spoof arbitrary email signatures via public keys
    containing crafted primary user ids (boo#1097525)

- enigmail 2.0.6.1:
  * fix compatibility issue with Thunderbird 60b7
  * disallow plaintext (literal packets) outside of encrpyted
    packets

- enigmail 2.0.6:
  * Replies to a partially encrypted message may have revealed
    protected information - no longer display PGP/MIME message
    part followed by unencrypted data (bsc#1094781)
  * Fix signature Spoofing via Inline-PGP in HTML Mails
  * Fix filter actions forgetting selected mail folder names

- enigmail 2.0.5:
  * Improvements on previous fixes on CVE-2017-17688, bsc#1093151
    and CVE-2017-17689, bsc#1093152 (EFAIL):
  - do not decrypt MIME parts unnecessarily
  - improve Error Message for Missing MDC

- enigmail 2.0.4:
  * CVE-2017-17688: CFB gadget attacks allowed to exfiltrate
    plaintext out of encrypted emails. enigmail now fails on GnuPG
    integrit check warnings for old Algorithms (EFAIL, bsc#1093151)
  * CVE-2017-17689: CBC gadget attacks allows to exfiltrate
    plaintext out of encrypted emails (EFAIL), bsc#1093152)

- enigmail 2.0.3 addresses the following issues (bsc#1092581):
  Stability and functionality:
  * Thunderbird may at displaying a message with an encrypted e-mail
  * Crash from processing double encrypted PGP/MIME message
  * Specific UI interaction sequence may prevent editing OpenPGP
    settings
  * Filter might not not executed at Thunderbird startup for ne
    message
  * gpg not terminated correctly when canceling "Import Key"
  Encryption/Decryption:
  * Saving encrypted draft leaks subject (even if protected headers
    are used)
  * manual PGP/MIME sig verification not working
  * Autocrpyt "addr" address might not match "From" header
  * Viewing S/MIME signed email disables PGP signature checks
  * S/MIME signing/encryption defaults not applied correctly
  E-mail subject handling:
  * Double "Re:" prefix on replies
  * "Re:" prefix on subject line disappears when editing encrypted,
    saved draft
  * Encrypted Message" subject in reply messages

- enigmail 2.0.2, addressing more regressions in 2.0/2.0.1:
  * protected headers should not check for force-display part
  * Incorrectly displayed subject line in writing dialog when
    forwarding
  * Error in Preferences Dialog upon loading
  * Autocrypt messages were unreadable without Enigmail

- enigmail 2.0.1, addressing several issues found in 2.0:
  * S/MIME signing/encryption not working correctly, if Enigmail
    is not enabled for an account
  * Emails fail to decrypt if the sender address contains brackets
  * Autocrypt-headers may flip manually created per-recipient rules
  * The key manager does not load if no key on the keyring

- enigmail 2.0:
  * The Encryption and Signing buttons now work for both OpenPGP
    and S/MIME. Enigmail will chose between S/MIME or OpenPGP
    depending on whether the keys for all recipients are available
    for the respective standard.
  * Support for the Autocrypt standard, which is now enabled by
    default.
  * Support for Pretty Easy Privacy (p?p) is implemented in
    Enigmail.
  * Support for Web Key Directory (WKD) is implemented. Enigmail
    will try to download unavailable keys during message
    composition from WKD. GnuPG 2.2.x is used the provider
    supports the Web Key Service protocol, users can also use
    Enigmail to upload keys to WKD.
  * The message subject can now be encrypted and replaced with a
    dummy subject, following the Memory Hole standard for
    protected Email Headers.
  * The keys on the keyring are automatically refreshed from
    keyservers at an irregular interval.
  * Enigmail was turned into a "restartless" addon. That is, once
    Enigmail is installed, subsequent updates will be installed
    without needing to restart Thunderbird.
  * Keys are internally addressed using the fingerprint instead of
    the key ID.
- Use %license (boo#1082318)

- enigmail 1.9.9, fixing multiple vulnerabilities (boo#1073858):
  * Enigmail could be coerced to use a malicious PGP public key
    with a corresponding secret key controlled by an attacker
  * Enigmail could have replayed encrypted content in partially
    encrypted e-mails, allowing a plaintext leak
  * Enigmail could be tricked into displaying incorrect signature
    verification results
  * Specially crafted content may cause denial of service